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Under the Direction of Page L. Anderson, PhD and Erin B. Tone, PhD

ABSTRACT
Information processing biases, such as interpretation bias and attention bias, play a
significant role in social anxiety disorder (Williams et al., 1997). Interpretation bias refers to the
tendency to interpret both negative and neutral stimuli as more negative than they are
objectively. Attention bias refers to the tendency to attend preferentially to threatening stimuli.
Socially anxious individuals display a negative interpretation bias for ambiguous social stimuli
(e.g., social scenarios) (for review see, Amir & Bomyea, 2010). In addition, socially anxious
individuals exhibit a bias to orient attention either towards or away from threatening social
stimuli (e.g., facial expressions; see Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Whereas an extensive body of

research focuses on both interpretation bias and attention bias in social anxiety in isolation, very
few studies have concurrently examined the associations between these two biases and social
anxiety symptoms and evaluated their distinct predictive power. Further, no studies have
examined their relation to behavioral avoidance, which is a key symptom of social anxiety that
directly contributes to clinical severity (Kazdin, 1999).
The current study examined how interpretation and attention biases independently relate
to symptomology, situational anxiety, and behavior in adults diagnosed with social anxiety
disorder. Thirty- four participants diagnosed with social anxiety completed computerized
interpretation bias and attention bias tasks, a behavioral avoidance speech task, and self-report
measures of state and trait social anxiety and general state anxiety. Results indicated that a
negative interpretation bias was significantly related to state and trait social anxiety and a lack of
benign interpretation bias was related to general state anxiety. There were no associations
between attention bias and anxiety or behavior. Findings highlight the unique importance of both
negative and benign interpretation biases in social phobia. Suggestions for future research
include incorporating benign interpretation training, particularly under stress, into treatment
programs such as cognitive modification or exposure therapy for social phobia.
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1
1.1

INTRODUCTION

Overview of social anxiety
Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) is characterized by persistent and exaggerated fear and

apprehension of social or performance situations involving possible negative evaluations by
others (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Individuals with SAD experience anxiety in,
and avoid, socially evaluative situations such as conversations, speaking with authorities, public
speaking, asserting themselves, and attending social events. Between 10-13% of the general
United States (US) population have SAD, making it the fourth most prevalent psychological
disorder (Magee, Eaton, Wittchen, McGonagle, & Kessler, 1996) and the second most common
anxiety disorder in the US (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005). SAD is debilitating–
individuals with SAD attain lower levels of educational achievement and earn less income; they
are also less likely to be married than their less anxious peers (Turner & Beidel, 1988). More
individuals with SAD fail to receive treatment than do individuals with other major psychiatric
disorders, and between 72% and 95% of individuals diagnosed report never having received
mental health treatment (Schneier, Johnson, Hornig, Liebowitz, & Weissman, 1992). Individuals
with social phobia participating in National Anxiety Disorders Screening Day indicated that the
most common barriers to treatment were uncertainty over where to go for treatment, inability to
afford services, and fear of what others might think if they sought help (Olfson et al., 2000).
1.2

Information processing biases in anxiety
Theoretical models of anxiety suggest that information processing biases (also referred to

as cognitive or cognitive processing biases) are crucial factors in the etiology, maintenance, and
treatment process of anxiety disorders, including SAD (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 2005;
Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997; Williams, Watts,
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MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). These biases involve the preferential or selective processing of
information: in the context of anxiety, information processing biases are specific to threatrelevant stimuli. Experimental psychopathologists have examined information processing biases
within three domains: attention, memory, and interpretation. These biases can manifest at two
stages of information processing: automatic and strategic. Automatic processing is effortless,
involuntary, and unintentional, whereas strategic or controlled processing is considered effortful,
voluntary, and intentional (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).
Information processing models of anxiety typically treat attention to and interpretation of
threat cues as two distinct processes that unfold sequentially. In general, these models posit that
threat identification (first at the automatic and second at the strategic stage) leads to allocation of
attention toward threatening stimuli (at both the automatic and strategic stages) (Bar-Haim,
Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Beck & Clark, 1997;
Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998). People with pathological anxiety overestimate the
threat value of information and allocate excessive attention toward processing the information
that they have perceived as threat-relevant. The current study focuses on these two processing
biases—interpretation and attention—in SAD.
1.3

Interpretation bias in social anxiety disorder
Interpretation biases lead anxious individuals to interpret ambiguous situations in a

negative manner (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994, 2005). Cognitive models of social anxiety
maintain that socially anxious individuals interpret interpersonal cues or evaluative feedback in
social situations, which are characteristically ambiguous, in a negative way (Clark & Wells,
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). A number of studies reveal a significant association between
social anxiety and interpretation bias (for review see, Amir & Bomyea, 2010) and show that
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socially anxious individuals interpret negative and ambiguous stimuli (e.g., social situations)
presented in the context of a variety of tasks more negatively than do non-anxious individuals.
Two studies have used questionnaire measures that comprise ambiguous social and nonsocial scenarios and verbal scripts to investigate interpretation bias in socially anxious samples
(Amin, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Stopa & Clark, 2000). These questionnaires require participants to
read ambiguous nonsocial (e.g., “You get your cable bill and notice that . . .”) and social
scenarios (e.g., “Someone you are interested in says 'Hello' to you), each followed by three
possible interpretations: positive (e.g., “S/he wants to get to know you”), negative (e.g., “S/he
feels sorry for you”), and neutral (e.g., “S/he says ‘Hello’ to everyone”). Participants rank order
the interpretations according to how likely they think each would come to mind, or they rate
which interpretation they believe more. Results from these two studies indicated that in both
clinical and non-clinical populations, socially anxious individuals endorsed negative
interpretations for ambiguous social scenarios as more readily accessible and more believable,
even when neutral and positive interpretations were available, than did less socially anxious
individuals.
Other studies have used visual stimuli, including images of facial expressions (Lira Yoon
& Zinbarg, 2007; Winton, Clark, & Edelmann, 1995) and video clips (Amir, Beard, & Bower,
2005), to measure interpretation bias in social anxiety, based in part on the idea that such stimuli,
which participants routinely encounter in day-to-day social life, may be more ecologically valid
(Risko, Laidlaw, Freeth, Foulsham, & Kingstone, 2012). In a study with a small non-clinical
sample (N=24) of individuals scoring high (n=13) or low (n=11) on the Fear of Negative
Evaluation (FNE) scale, participants in the high-FNE group labeled the affect displayed on both
negative (e.g., anger, sadness, disgust, fear) and neutral facial expressions as negative more often
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than did low-FNE subjects after members of both groups were told they might be chosen to give
a speech (Winton et al., 1995). In another study of non-clinical undergraduate participants,
individuals who were more socially anxious interpreted neutral facial expressions as more
threatening than did those who were less anxious, both when they were shown different types of
facial expressions and asked to label the emotions as positive, negative, neutral, bored or other
and when they were asked to tell stories about the pictures (e.g., “He was angry that he got a
lower grade than her.”) (Lira Yoon & Zinbarg, 2007).
Amir and colleagues (2005) examined the specificity of a negative interpretation bias to
social anxiety by comparing valence ratings (e.g., “very negative emotion” to “very positive
emotion”) of video clips of positive (e.g., “I really like your shoes), negative (e.g., “That is a
horrible hair cut”) and ambiguous (e.g., “That is an interesting shirt you have on”) statements
across socially anxious, anxious-dysphoric (i.e., trait anxious and depressed but not social
anxious), and non-anxious groups. In a sample of 75 undergraduates, participants were divided
into groups based on percentile scores on continuous measures of social anxiety and depression
(non-anxious controls scored in the bottom 15 percent on both measures, whereas the socially
anxious group scored higher on social anxiety measures than did the anxious-dysphoric group).
Results showed that the socially anxious group rated the ambiguous video clips as significantly
more negative (using a 7-point Likert rating scale) than did both non-anxious and anxiousdysphoric groups. In sum, studies using various stimulus types and methodologies suggest that
socially anxious individuals display a negative interpretation bias.
Although the studies described above yielded findings consistent with the hypothesis that
there is an association between interpretation bias and social anxiety, their methodologies
revolve around self-reported perceptions of stimuli, which may be subject to multiple layers of
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bias. Direct performance-based measures may yield more accurate estimates of interpretation
bias, because they assess the biased process itself rather than individuals’ perceptions of their
bias. Interpretive processes are thought to occur quickly; individuals may even be unaware that
the processes are occurring (Rozenman, Amir, & Weersing, 2014). Self-report measures require
the use of higher level processing that may not reflect automatic interpretation; these measures
also may preferentially elicit desirability-based responses (e.g., "responding the way one thinks
he or she should") (Rozenman et al., 2014). A measure that provides a more direct evaluation of
interpretation bias than self-report measures may yield more accurate and more real-world
consistent estimates.
Beard and Amir developed the Word Sentence Association Paradigm (WSAP; Beard &
Amir, 2008) as a more direct measure of interpretation bias. During administration of this
computerized measure, participants view threatening (e.g., “weird” or “warning”) and nonthreatening words (e.g., “cool” and “awake”) followed by social (e.g., “Someone looks at you as
you walk by”) and non-social sentences (e.g., “The alarm goes off”). Participants are then asked
to indicate whether the word and sentence are related or not. The rationale behind the task is to
target an online and unconscious measure of interpretation by asking participants to make a short
evaluation of seemingly irrelevant content (e.g., subjects are not being asked to trigger their own
bias by imagining being in a situation; rather, they are simply responding to sentences and
words). Beard and Amir (2008) found that social anxiety correlated negatively with nonthreatening endorsement (i.e., indicating that a neutral word and a social sentence pair were
related) and positively with threatening endorsement (i.e., indicating that a threat word and a
social sentence pair were related) in two samples, one undergraduate sample and one sample of
people scoring high on a measure of social anxiety. In other words, individuals with higher
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levels of social anxiety more often endorsed non-threatening word-sentence pairs as non-related
and threatening pairs as related than did individuals with lower levels of anxiety, leading the
authors to conclude that socially anxious individuals display a negative interpretation bias.
Researchers have also experimentally manipulated socially anxious individuals’
interpretation biases by training individuals to interpret social stimuli in a certain way by
rewarding non-threatening interpretations more often than threatening ones, in order to induce a
benign interpretation bias. For example, in such an interpretation modification paradigm, a
“Correct!” message might appear after an individual indicates that a sentence and neutral word
are related. Murphy and colleagues (2007) found that after one session of interpretation
modification, socially anxious participants who received a benign interpretation induction
reported feeling less anxious about a future social situation than did socially anxious participants
who received no interpretation manipulation. Beard and Amir (2008) found that after eight
sessions of interpretation modification or no modification (i.e., participants complete the task
without any feedback), participants who completed the benign induction modification generated
fewer threat interpretations and more benign interpretations and also endorsed fewer social
anxiety symptoms than participants in the no modification condition. They interpreted their
results as indicating that changes in interpretation patterns mediated the program’s effect on
social anxiety, because increases in benign interpretation correlated with decreases in social
anxiety symptoms.
Empirical data indicate that socially anxious individuals exhibit a negative interpretation
bias for verbal and non-verbal stimuli, as measured by self-report questionnaires and by direct
assessment of performance on an interpretation task. What is still unknown is whether
interpretation bias is related to behavioral avoidance in individuals with SAD. This question is
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important to address, because behavioral avoidance is a significant and impairing symptom of
the disorder. If interpretation bias is related to behavioral avoidance, then perhaps modifying bias
as a form of treatment could provide an alternative to gold standards of treatment, such as
exposure therapy, that is more accessible (requiring access only to a computer versus to a trained
clinician).
1.4

Attention bias in social anxiety disorder
The relation between behavioral avoidance and attention bias also has yet to be studied.

General cognitive models of anxiety posit that anxious individuals display an attention bias; in
other words, they preferentially attend to threatening stimuli (e.g., Eysenck & Derakshan, 1997;
Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1997). Prominent cognitive models of social anxiety
have linked attention bias to the maintenance and development of social phobia. Interestingly,
however, whereas one cognitive model of social anxiety proposes an attention bias, or vigilance,
toward socially threatening stimuli external to the person (such as a frowning face (Rapee &
Heimberg, 1997), another posits that social anxiety is characterized by self-focused attention
(Clark & Wells, 1995), which implies that affected individuals will display an attention bias
away from, or avoidance of, threatening stimuli in the external environment. In their model,
Rapee and Heimberg (1997) propose that socially anxious individuals scan their environments
for threatening cues (e.g., signs of negative evaluation) and have difficulty disengaging attention
from them. Clark and Wells (1995), on the other hand, propose that during socially threatening
situations socially anxious individuals avoid external cues, turn their attention inward, and
become self-focused, attending preferentially to internal cues for information (e.g., "My face
feels flushed, other people know I am nervous"). According to this model, socially anxious
individuals miss signals regarding the persistence of threat or markers of safety from the
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environment because they are focused on the internal experiences of anxiety. To address these
competing models, Schultz and Heimberg (2008) conducted a review of the literature and
concluded that while current research lacks direct investigation of these models (e.g., we do not
know if participants are self-focused if they avoid external cues), it is likely that socially anxious
individuals attend to both external and internal cues throughout the course of a social situation.
Most studies have used dot probe tasks to measure attention bias (MacLeod,
Mathews, & Tata, 1986). In a typical dot probe task, participants are first presented with a
fixation marker (e.g. a “+” sign) in the middle of a computer screen, followed by a pair of words
presented either horizontally (one next to the other) or vertically (one directly above the other).
On critical trials, one of the words in the pair is neutral (e.g., "table") and the other is threatening
(e.g., "humiliation"). Other trials may consist of two neutral words or one positive and one
neutral word. Each pair of words appears on the screen for a brief duration, usually in the range
of 500 to 1500 milliseconds. Immediately following the word pair, a probe (a dot or an asterisk)
appears in the location of one of the words from the pair. Participants must then press one of two
buttons on a keyboard to identify the location of the probe (left versus right or top versus bottom)
on the screen. The probe stimulus that participants respond more quickly to is assumed to be the
region of display (threatening or neutral) preferentially attended to. Therefore faster response
times to probes behind the threatening words relative to the non-threatening words reflect a bias
toward threat (vigilance), and slower response times indicate a bias away from threat
(avoidance).
Recent research on attention bias in socially anxious individuals has used a modified
version of the dot probe task that incorporates emotional facial stimuli rather than social verbal
stimuli, based on the idea that expressive faces should constitute more salient stimuli than do
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words in a social interaction (Planalp, De Francisco, & Rutherford, 1996). In the modified
version of the task, individuals view neutral faces paired with happy, threatening, or neutral
faces. Researchers have argued that the modified dot probe task is a more ecologically valid
measure of attention bias in social phobia than the original dot probe task, because facial
expressions are a major source of information in social situations (Planalp et al., 1996).
Studies using dot probe tasks to measure attentional bias within non-clinical and clinical
populations of socially anxious people have variously found evidence of a vigilant bias (Mogg &
Bradley, 2002; Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004; Pishyar, Harris, & Menzies, 2004; Sposari &
Rapee, 2007), an avoidant bias (Chen, Ehlers, Clark, & Mansell, 2002; Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, &
Chen, 1999), and an absence of any significant bias (Bradley et al., 1997; Pineless & Mineka,
2005). For example, in clinical samples of socially anxious individuals, Sposari and Rapee
(2007) found a vigilant attention bias for social threat stimuli, while Chen et al. (2002) found an
avoidant attention bias for socially threatening stimuli. Both studies used the modified dot probe
task described above and included the same number of trials with stimuli presented for the same
duration of time.
Another study of individuals with social phobia suggest that they may in fact display one
of two distinct subtypes of attention bias – vigilant and avoidant—that differentially respond to
treatment (Calamaras, Tone, & Anderson, 2012). In a sample of 24 socially phobic adults,
Calamaras and colleagues (2012) found that participants displayed either attentional vigilance for
threat (62%) or attentional avoidance (38%) prior to treatment, and that these distinct groups
showed different patterns of attentional change following treatment - the vigilant group became
less vigilant and the avoidant group became less avoidant and even slightly vigilant.
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Research has also examined the manipulability of attention biases by either inducing an
attention bias to increase social anxiety (Heeren, Peschard, & Philippot, 2012) or by using
attention retraining paradigms as a treatment method for SAD (Amir et al., 2009). In attention
retraining paradigms, the probe is placed behind the neutral face rather than the threat face the
majority of the time, with the aim of reducing attention to threatening stimuli and decreasing
anxiety symptoms in an anxious individual (e.g., Amir et al., 2009; Bunnell, Beidel, & Mesa,
2013; Schmidt, Richey, Buckner, & Timpano, 2009). Initially, studies supported attention
retraining as a means to reduce social anxiety; people with social anxiety randomly assigned to
attention retraining reported less social anxiety. Two randomized-controlled studies, which used
the same attention retraining procedures and equal numbers of sessions, found significant
differences in post-treatment anxiety levels between social phobics who received attention
retraining and those who completed a control version of the task (Amir et al., 2009 and Schmidt
et al., 2009). Gains in the retraining groups were maintained four months later. Both studies
utilized clinician-administered (blinded to treatment condition) and self-report measures of
anxiety, including the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS) and the Social Phobia and
Anxiety Inventory (SPAI). Interestingly, Schmidt and colleagues (2009) found no significant
differences between retraining and control groups on self-report measures at post treatment (only
clinician administered ones); however, there were significant differences at the 4-month followup across all measures. In both studies, greater proportions of participants in the retraining group
(50% and 72%) no longer met DSM criteria for SAD compared to the control groups (14% and
11%) after treatment.
Recent randomized controlled trials of attention retraining interventions have failed to
replicate the initial positive results (e.g., Bunnell et al., 2013; Carlbring et al., 2012; Neubauer et
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al., 2013). For example, using the same procedures within a sample (N=31) that was comparable
to those enrolled in the Amir et al. (2009) and Schmidt et al. (2009) studies, Bunnell and
colleagues (2013) found no post-treatment differences between groups on both clinicianadministered and self-report measures of anxiety after treatment. Similarly, randomizedcontrolled studies examining internet-delivered attention retraining have revealed null findings
using self-report measures of social anxiety (Carlbring et al., 2012; Neubauer et al., 2013).
While it is unclear why subsequent studies have failed to replicate the initial positive findings
regarding attention retraining and its effects, it is clear that future research is warranted—
particularly research that includes assessments of behavior in addition to self and clinician rated
measures (Hereen et al., 2015).
1.5

The relation between cognition and behavior
Cognitive behavioral models of anxiety describe theoretical relations among anxiety-

relevant thoughts (e.g., cognitive biases), feelings (e.g., anxiety), and behavior (e.g., escape or
avoidance). These models suggest that thoughts (e.g., "This situation is scary") related to a
stimulus (e.g., "a party") likely evoke or perpetuate an emotion (e.g., anxiety) that guides specific
behavior (e.g., "only socialize with friends or don’t attend"). According to classic fear response
models, anxiety engenders one of two behavioral responses: flight (flee the situation) or fight
(prepare to defend oneself) (Cannon, 1929; McFarland, 1981). In most social situations, a
socially phobic individual is likely to respond with a flight response or behavioral avoidance; in
other words, the individual will typically leave or elect not to enter the situation (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013).
Cognitive behavioral models of anxiety suggest that maladaptive cognitions lead to
increased anxiety and behavioral avoidance (Beck & Clark, 1997; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994).
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Therefore, cognitive-behavioral theorists propose that a cognitive bias—involving attention or
interpretation—activated when a person is faced with a feared situation leads that individual to
experience anxiety and to engage in behavioral avoidance (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). For
example, a socially anxious individual who is giving a speech may seek out and attend to
negative facial expressions (e.g., bored) to confirm her belief that she is performing poorly. Her
negative interpretation of the audience’s expressions, which leads her to continue to attend to
them, increases her anxiety and discomfort. This distress, in turn, leads her to cut her speech
short in order to get off of the stage (behavioral avoidance). When she thinks about her
experience in this situation, she is likely to avoid similar situations in the future because she does
not want to experience the same distress. Behavioral avoidance is critical in the maintenance of
anxiety disorders, particularly social anxiety, because by avoiding objectively safe social
situations, socially anxious individuals miss opportunities to learn that situations that they find
anxiety-provoking will not necessarily result in rejection or other negative consequences. This
lack of learning opportunities, in turn, leaves them unable to recalibrate their anxiety response.
Behavioral avoidance leads to a narrowing of an individual’s life experiences.
Consequently, it is associated with significant functional impairment—avoidant individuals
restrict themselves to only experiencing situations that do not induce anxiety (e.g. staying home),
and thus they miss out on numerous other potentially rewarding experiences (e.g., meeting new
people) and fail to engage in necessary activities for life (e.g., having a job) (Ledley et al., 2008).
Further, because avoidant individuals deny themselves opportunities to learn that feared
consequences of more varied experiences are unlikely, they are prone to remain anxious about
those experiences.
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Because behavioral avoidance is thus thought to contribute to the maintenance of social
anxiety disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), current gold standard treatment
models are built around exposure paradigms. These paradigms require anxious individuals to
face feared situations in order to extinguish their exaggerated fear responses (Feske &
Chambless, 1995; Hope, Heimberg, & Bruch, 1995). Exposure therapy leads to reduced
symptoms of distress and avoidance measured by self-report questionnaires and behavioral
laboratory tasks (e.g., giving an impromptu speech) (Taylor et al., 1996; Gould et al., 1997).
Exposure therapy has also been shown to result in reduced cognitive biases (e.g., reduced
negative thoughts relating to a social situation or reduced fears of negative evaluation) in social
anxiety (Newman, Hofmann, Trabert, Roth, & Taylor, 1994).
Very little research has examined relations between information processing biases and
behavior in social anxiety. One study examined the effects of attention retraining on behavioral
outcomes including length of eye contact, time spent speaking, and whether participants ended
the conversation or discontinued speaking early (escape) in a clinical sample, and found no
significant differences at post treatment between the retraining condition and the control group
(Bunnell et al., 2012). Lange and colleagues (2010) manipulated interpretation bias in a sample
of participants who scored in the average range on an anxiety measure. Specifically, they
induced a positive or negative interpretation bias using a task in which participants completed
socially ambiguous vignettes by filling in the missing letter of the last word, resulting in either a
positive or negative scene. Results showed no differences in what the authors termed “reflexive
anxious behavior” (e.g., moving away from faces in a crowd) between those who were trained to
interpret social situations negatively and those in the positive training condition. Notably, the
researchers used a sample of individuals with average levels of anxiety; members of such a
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sample may respond differently than do people in a clinical sample. Interestingly, neither
Bunnell et al. (2012) nor Lange et al. (2010) looked at whether attention or interpretation bias
scores were related to anxious behavior. Examining relations among cognitive biases and actual
behavior would add further value by providing a more ecologically valid assessment of “realworld” functional impairment and help to inform newly developing treatments targeting bias
modification (Kazdin, 1999).
1.6

Examining interpretation bias and attention bias together
Cognitive models of social anxiety propose that information processing biases, such as

interpretation bias and attention bias, interact with one another to affect social anxiety and
maladaptive behavior, and that cognitive and behavioral processes may influence one another in
various ways (Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006). For example, negatively interpreting a stimulus
is likely to lead a socially anxious individual to further allocate attention towards the stimulus
(e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997). Conversely, preferential attention to a negative stimulus may
facilitate negative interpretations of negative, neutral, or even positive stimuli because in order to
evaluate a stimulus, one must perceive and attend to it first. Researchers highlight the need for
further empirical data examining multiple biases simultaneously, as most of the body of literature
on cognitive biases in anxiety, and specifically social anxiety, have examined these processes
only in isolation (Hirsch et al., 2006). One question that needs examination is whether
interpretation bias and attention bias may be differentially related to distress levels and behavior
in social anxiety. For example, negative interpretation of stimuli could lead an individual to flee
a situation, while excessive attention to negative stimuli results in heightened anxiety. It is also
plausible that both types of bias may make equal contributions to symptomology. Theoretical
models propose that these biases are unique components of information processing that together
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influence anxiety (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997); however, research has
yet to determine whether they have distinct effects on symptom severity and/or behavior.
To date, two studies have examined attention and interpretation biases simultaneously in
anxious individuals (Brosan, Hoppitt, Shelfer, Sillence, & Mackintosh, 2011; Beard, Wiesberg,
& Amir, 2011). Brosan and colleagues (2011) examined the efficacy of combined cognitive
bias modification (CBM) for attention and interpretation biases (i.e., participants completed an
attention retraining program and an interpretation bias modification program) for decreasing both
state and trait anxiety in a small outpatient sample of 12 individuals diagnosed with social
anxiety or generalized anxiety. Results indicated that after four weeks of both attention and
interpretation retraining, patients showed reductions in attention for threat and negative
interpretation bias, as well as reductions in trait and state anxiety. Beard and colleagues (2011)
conducted a randomized-controlled trial to examine the efficacy of combined CBM in a sample
of 34 individuals diagnosed with social anxiety disorder. Results indicated that after 8 weeks of
combined CBM, participants receiving CBM had significantly reduced self-reported symptoms
of social anxiety and improved performance on an impromptu speech compared to the placebo
group. Thus, these results suggest that targeting both biases in combination results in reduced
state and trait anxiety; however, whether this effect is driven by one type of training more than
the other is unknown.
The findings’ of the above studies are difficult to evaluate because of many
methodological limitations. Because the study was conducted within a routine clinical practice,
standardized research diagnostic measures were not used. Instead, clinical or counseling
psychologists identified the presence or absence of primary anxiety problems using semistructured assessments that covered the main symptoms of disorders based on DSM-IV criteria.
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The authors did not report what proportion of the sample endorsed problems associated primarily
with social anxiety versus generalized anxiety. Therefore, it could not be determined whether
the results were driven primarily by the generalized anxiety participants or by the social anxiety
participants. Additionally, the authors did not specify which type of training (attention or
interpretation) was more strongly associated with symptom reduction, nor did they report
whether either bias related to anxiety severity at baseline. Further, only five of the participants
had clinically significant changes in anxiety levels after treatment. Finally, the study did not
include a behavioral measure of anxiety, which Kazdin (1999) contends can provide a more valid
measure of “real-world” functioning and assessment of the clinical significance of a
psychological disorder. Therefore, associations among attention bias, interpretation bias, and
baseline anxiety or behavior remain unclear, as does the degree to which each contributes to
anxious symptomology.
While there is a lack of published studies that offer direct evidence, the current literature
could suggest that interpretation bias may be more directly related to anxiety symptomology and
behavioral avoidance for several reasons. First, information processing models of anxiety
specifically suggest that overestimation of the threat posed by benign stimuli is the main problem
that needs to be addressed in the treatment of anxiety disorders (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg,
1985). Furthermore, in theory, interpretation guides further allocation of attention for
processing, such that if a stimulus is evaluated as threatening, further attention will be given to
that stimulus.

Therefore, if a person does not interpret a stimulus as threatening, that person is

unlikely to attend to it further. Consequently, the person may not generate negative
interpretations of the stimulus that influence behavior. For example, if a person does not
perceive an audience to be negatively evaluating him, any anxiety that he feels about his
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performance will likely decrease and he will not be motivated to engage in avoidant behavior,
such as cutting his speech short.
Second, evidence for the positive relation between interpretation bias and social anxiety
symptoms is robust across numerous studies of varied methodology, including some that
employed experimental designs (Murphy et al., 2007; Beard 2008). In contrast, the literature on
attention bias and social anxiety is variable, with some studies finding no evidence for an
attention bias in social phobia (Bradley et al., 1997; Pineless & Mineka, 2005). In addition,
literature supports the idea that reducing negative interpretations is related to reduced anxiety,
while the attention bias retraining literature is not promising (e.g., Bunnell et al., 2013; Carlbring
et al., 2012; Neubauer et al., 2013). Finally, anecdotal comments from participants in treatment
studies suggest that people find interpretation bias retraining to be more beneficial than attention
retraining. In their combined cognitive bias treatment study, Brosan and colleagues (2011)
reported that patients described the attention retraining task as boring, and the interpretation bias
task as helpful in “getting you to alter your perception and realize there are a different ways of
seeing things” (p. 262).
1.7

Justification and hypotheses
The current study aimed to add to the literature on cognitive processes in social anxiety

by examining relations among interpretation bias, attention bias, symptom severity, and both
behavior and self-reported situational anxiety during a socially threatening situation. The current
study also aimed to examine whether interpretation bias and/or attention bias are distinct
predictors of anxiety and behavior in a clinical sample of socially anxious individuals. I
hypothesized that both attention bias and interpretation bias would relate significantly to
behavior, as measured by speech length during a laboratory impromptu speech task, which is
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commonly associated with higher levels of anxiety (Beidel, Turner, Jacob, & Cooley, 1989) and
self-reported anxiety during and immediately after the task. I also hypothesized that
interpretation bias would be a stronger predictor of both anxiety levels and behavioral avoidance.
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2
2.1

EXPERIMENT

Participants
Participants were 34 English-speaking individuals with a primary diagnosis of social

anxiety disorder, as assessed by the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV (SCID; First,
Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 2002). Participants were recruited through advertisements (e.g.,
newspaper, Internet, flyers), referrals from local clinicians, and the Georgia State University
SONA undergraduate psychology research participant pool. Participants on psychoactive
medication were required to be stabilized on their current medication(s) and dosage(s) for at least
3 months and to remain at the stabilized dosage throughout the course of the study. Individuals
meeting any of the following criteria were excluded: history of mania or psychoses, recent
suicidal ideation (within the past 3 months), and/or current alcohol or substance abuse or
dependence.
The sample was mostly female (65%) with a mean age of 23 (SD= 6.07). Half of the
same identified as Black/African American, about a third as White/Caucasian (29%), less than a
quarter as Asian American (14%) and the rest as Hispanic (6%). The majority of the sample was
single (91%) and the rest described themselves as living with someone (8%). The sample
comprised mostly college students (65%) and the median total annual household income was
$10,000-20,000.
2.2

Measures
Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV (SCID; First et al., 2002). The SCID is a

structured, well-validated diagnostic clinical interview used to assess psychological disorders
based upon DSM-IV criteria. Several studies (Basco et al., 2000; Kranzler, Kadden, Babor,
Tennen, & Rounsaville, 1996) have demonstrated superior diagnostic validity of the SCID over
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standard clinical interviews at intake, particularly for Axis I disorders (Lobbestael, Leurgans, &
Arntz, 2011). For the current project, the SCID was used to establish whether potential
participants meet the inclusion criterion of a diagnosis of social phobia, as well as whether they
demonstrate presence of co-morbid Axis I conditions within the mood, alcohol/substance use,
and anxiety disorders modules.
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale– Self Report Version (LSAS-SR; Liebowitz, 1987). The
LSAS-SR, a 24-item self-report instrument assessing fear and avoidance across a variety of
social interactions and performance situations, was used to assess symptom severity. The
measure is appropriate to complete electronically (Hedman et al., 2010). Participants used a
Likert-type scale to provide ratings of fear (0 = none, 1 = mild, 2 = moderate, 3 = severe) and
avoidance (0 = never, 1 = occasionally, 2 = often, 3 = usually) for each item. Higher total scores
on the fear and avoidance subscales, respectively, indicate greater anxiety and avoidance. Total
scores on each scale (fear and avoidance) served as dependent variables.
The LSAS-SR has demonstrated high internal consistency among clinically socially
anxious individuals (α = .95) as well as among individuals without an Axis I disorder (α = .94),
and it appears to have strong convergent and discriminant validity (Fresco et al., 2001).
Furthermore, responses and scores obtained using the LSAS-SR have not been found to differ
from those obtained using a clinician-administered version of the LSAS, and subscale
intercorrelations for the two forms are extremely similar (Fresco et al., 2001). Normative data
for a sample of 382 patients diagnosed with social phobia yielded a mean fear score of 35.5 (SD
= 13.6), and a mean avoidance score of 31.6 (SD = 14.5) (Heimberg et al., 1999). In the current
study, both scales—fear and avoidance—showed excellent reliability, with Cronbach alphas of
.97 and .96, respectively.
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Word Sentence Association Paradigm (WSAP; Beard & Amir, 2008). The WSAP, a
computerized task used to assess interpretation bias in social anxiety, served as the measure of
interpretation bias. Prior to starting the task, participants reviewed instructions on the computer
screen with the assessor. The task consisted of four steps. First, a fixation cross, used to direct
participants’ attention towards the middle of the screen and alert them that a trial is beginning,
appeared on the screen for 500 milliseconds (ms). Second, a word representing either a threat
interpretation (e.g., “embarrassing”) or a non-threat interpretation (e.g., “funny”) appeared in the
center of the screen for 500 ms. Next, an ambiguous sentence (e.g., “People laugh after
something you said”) appeared on the screen until the participant pressed the space bar to
indicate that he or she had finished reading it. Finally, the prompt “Are they related?” appeared
on the screen. Participants pressed “#1” on the keypad if the word and sentence appeared to be
related, and “#3” on the keypad if they did not appear to be related.
Participants completed 110 trials of the WSAP. Seventy-six trials included sentences
with social themes and 34 trials were non-social filler sentences (e.g., “A loud noise is heard at
night”). All text appeared in black font against a gray background. For each participant, I
calculated the proportion of threat interpretation trials and benign interpretation trials endorsed
out of the total number of respective trials presented. Endorsed trials are those in which the word
and sentence are identified as related. The percentage of threat trials endorsed served as an
independent variable in study analyses. Previous research has shown that the WSAP task validly
discriminates between socially anxious individuals and non-anxious controls (Beard & Amir,
2009). Furthermore, symptom severity is positively correlated with threat endorsement rates and
negatively correlated with non-threat endorsement rates.
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Dot Probe Task. A modified version of the dot probe task was used to assess attention
bias toward threatening faces relative to neutral and positive faces. The stimuli and task were
developed by Mogg and Bradley (1999); the measure consists of 128 stimulus faces, 2 from each
of 64 different models. Each model presents both a threatening or happy pose and a neutral
pose. Thus, there are 32 threatening faces and 32 happy faces, each matched with a neutral
image of the same person. Stimuli were presented in pairs, threat-neutral and happy-neutral,
with one image on each side of the screen (e.g., threat on the right and neutral on the left). Each
pair was presented twice, with the location of each image reversed (e.g., threat on the left and
neutral on the right). Thus, there were 128 critical trials. In addition, 32 filler trials consisting of
neutral-neutral pairs were randomly interspersed throughout the task. Trials were presented in a
new random order for each participant. Participants completed a practice run of 5 trials before
completing the actual task.
Participants completed the modified dot probe task on a desktop computer. They were
instructed to use the “#1” and “#2” buttons on the keyboard to provide their responses; these
keys were marked with white labels. An instruction screen appeared at the start of the task and
the assessor reviewed it with participants. First, a fixation a cross appeared on the screen for 500
ms to direct the participant’s attention to the screen. Second, a pair of faces (approximately 4.5 x
7 cm each) was presented on the screen for 500 ms and a small asterisk appeared for 1100
immediately afterwards, in place of one of the faces. As quickly as possible, participants pressed
the “#1” key to indicate that the dot was on the left or the “#2” to indicate that it was on the right.
The probe appeared an equal number of times on each side of the screen. The inter-trial interval
varied randomly between 500 and 1250 ms.
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Given that attention bias in social anxiety is typically specific to the processing of
threatening stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), the current study examined responses to threatening
and neutral faces. Threat bias scores were calculated by subtracting response time on trials in
which a probe that replaces a neutral stimulus face from response time on trials in which a probe
replaces a threat stimulus face. A positive average value indicated a vigilant bias (preferential
attention toward threatening faces relative to neutral faces) and a negative average value
indicated an avoidance bias (preferential attention away from threatening faces toward neutral
faces). This score served as an independent variable in study analyses. Previous research
suggests that the task accurately discriminates between adults diagnosed with Social Phobia and
controls (Mogg et al., 2004). It also has been shown to discriminate between controls and adults
with Generalized Anxiety Disorder (Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom, & Bono, 1999).
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). The
STAI, a 20-item measure that assesses in-the-moment symptoms of general anxiety, was used to
assess anxiety immediately following the speech task. Participants rated their current anxiety
using a 4-point Likert scale, (1= not at all, 2= somewhat, 3= moderately so, and 4= very much
so). The measure has adequate psychometric properties, with internal consistency coefficients
ranging from .86 to .95 (Spielberger & Gorsuch, 1983). In the current study, the STAI-state
showed excellent reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of .93.
The Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression (CES-D; Radloff, 1977). The CESD is a 20-item measure of depression symptomology, including restless sleep, poor appetite, and
feelings of loneliness. Individuals are asked to rate how they have felt over the past week on a 4point Likert scale (0= rarely or none of the time, 1= some or little of the time, 2= moderately or
much of the time, and 3= most or almost all the time). Scores range from 0 to 60, with higher

24

scores indicating more, and more frequently experienced, depressive symptoms. The measure is
often used to identify individuals at risk for clinical depression and has good sensitivity and
specificity and high internal consistency (Lewinsohn, Seeley, Roberts, & Allen, 1997). It can
also be used appropriately with racially diverse populations, with internal consistency
coefficients ranging from .85 to .91 and similar to those found in the general population and
patient samples (Roberts, 1980). Depression scores were included a covariate in study analyses.
In the current study, the CESD showed excellent reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of .91.
Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS; Wolpe, 1973). The SUDS is a self-report
face-valid scale that is used to assess current distress or anxiety. SUDS ratings served as an
index of situational anxiety; this rating score was included as a dependent variable in study
analyses. A SUDS of 0 represents the absence of any distress or anxiety, 50 represents moderate
distress or anxiety, and 100 represents the most distress or anxiety imaginable. SUDS ratings are
commonly used during exposure therapy and emotion-focused therapy for trauma-related and
anxiety disorders, as well as during assessment (e. g., during a behavioral avoidance task; see
below) (Kim, Bae, & Chon Park, 2008; Wolpe & Lazarus, 1966).
Behavioral Avoidance Test (BAT). The BAT is based on a commonly-used standardized
speech assessment protocol (Beidel et al., 1989) and involves the delivery of an impromptu
speech. The BAT is widely used in research, particularly in social anxiety treatment studies,
where it serves as a measure of efficacy (Heimberg, 1998; Coles & Heimberg 2000). Speech
length, which has been shown to be a reliable measure of “escape” or behavioral avoidance
(Beidel et al., 1989), was included as a dependent variable in study analyses. Participants were
asked to give a 10-minute speech on up to three chosen topics while they were videotaped.
Participants spoke in front of the lab assessor and two other research team members. Participants
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were not forced or coerced to complete the task in any way and were allowed to discontinue
speaking at any point. Topics were intended to be challenging or controversial, so that they
would elicit high anxiety. Examples of topics included: capital punishment, abortion, and
nuclear power. Participants were given 5 minutes to take notes and prepare. Participants were
asked to give SUDS anxiety ratings prior to speaking, every 2 minutes while speaking, and at the
end of speaking. Audience members were instructed to display neutral facial expressions during
the speech and were asked to privately rate the participant’s performance and perceived anxiety
level, using a 0 to 10 Likert scale, after the speech.
2.3

Procedure
This project was approved by the Georgia State University Institutional Review Board

(IRB). The study was advertised via flyers and radio public service announcements. Individuals
interested in participating in the study contacted the lab via telephone or email. A trained
graduate student conducted the initial screening segment of a two-part assessment process via
telephone to determine initial eligibility (i.e., no suicidal ideation, meets basic
inclusion/exclusion criteria, passes brief initial diagnostic screening and rule-out process).
Potentially eligible participants were scheduled for the second, in-person part of the assessment
process (Time 1 visit) to confirm eligibility. All assessments took place in a psychology
laboratory on the 10th floor of the Urban Life building at Georgia State University. During the
in-person segment of the eligibility-ascertainment process, a trained graduate student
administered the SCID. Participants meeting DSM-IV criteria for social anxiety disorder as their
primary diagnosis were enrolled in the study, assigned a study participant number, and scheduled
for a Time 2 visit one week later (parking passes for that visit was provided when needed). At
Time 2, participants completed the self-report questionnaires, the dot-probe task, the WSAP, and
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the BAT. They also completed the STAI immediately following their impromptu speech (BAT).
The order of administration for the dot-probe and WSAP was randomized for each participant to
reduce the risk that confounds due to task order would impede interpretation of results. All other
tasks remained in a standard order. Random task order was be determined by flipping a coin
(heads = dot-probe first, tails = WSAP first) prior to the start of the assessment; the order was
noted in the participant’s data. At the end of Time 2, participants were compensated $50 and
provided with referrals for psychotherapy and other resources (e.g., information about
Toastmasters). Figure 1 provides a flow chart of participation in the study.

If primary SAD,
scheduled Time 2

Completed Time 2
assessment: self-report
measures, dot-probe,
WSAP, BAT
compensated and
provided referrals

If potentially eligible,
completed in-person
SCID assessment
Contacted lab &
complete phone
screener

If no primary SAD,
discontinued

If ineligible,
discontinued

Figure 1: Participation flow chart

2.4

Analyses and sample size
Multiple regression analyses were conducted to test the hypothesis that attention bias and

interpretation bias would differentially predict symptom severity (measured by the LSAS-SR
total fear and avoidance subscale scores), situational anxiety (measured by the highest SUDS
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rating during the BAT), and behavioral avoidance (measured by BAT speech length). Partial
correlations were examined to further explore the distinct contributions of each predictor to
variance in the outcome while all other independent variables were covaried.
A sample size of 34 was determined (using GPower) to be sufficient to detect expected
moderate effect sizes (.25) with a power of .80. I expected to find similar effect sizes to those
reported in the existing literature. A meta-analysis of studies on attention bias and anxiety
indicated an average effect size of d=.45, with a range of d= .23-.69 (Bar-Haim et al., 2007).
Effect sizes for interpretation bias and anxiety in previous literature range from d = .25 to 1.13
(e.g., Franklin, Huppert, Langner, Leiberg, & Foa, 2005; Stopa & Clark, 2000). A review of
cognitive bias modification and anxiety indicated an average effect size of d =.51, with a range
of d =.35-.69 (Hakamata et al., 2010). I used the smallest effect size reported in the previous
literature in my power analysis to ensure a sufficient sample size.
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3
3.1

RESULTS

Data inspection and score calculation
Analyses were conducted using the SPSS 21.0 program. Data were first inspected for

outliers and evaluated for fit between variable distributions and the assumptions of multivariate
analysis, which they met satisfactorily (Cohen & Cohen, 2003). Means and standard deviations
of all variables are presented in Table 1. Simple correlations were examined among all variables
to determine appropriate covariates (see Table 2).
Table 1: Means and standard de viations (N=34)
Mean
SD
LSASfear

51.029

19.457

LSASavoid

49.353

18.627

CESD

33.618

13.880

ThreatEndorse (%)

.681

.205

BenignEndorse (%)

.649

.213

AttnBias

8.622

16.540

STAI- State

59.876

11.872

Peak SUDS

8.265

1.463

Speech Length (in seconds)

347.765

213.145
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Table 2: Zero-order correlations between variables (N=34)
LSAS
LSAS
Threat
Benign
CESD
Fear
Avoid
Endorse Endorse

Attn

STAI-

Peak

Speech

Bias

State

SUDS

Length

LSASfear

-

.956**

.813**

.498*

-.513**

-.052

.217

.019

.196

LSASavoid

-

-

.743**

.448**

-.496**

-.051

.230

.022

.158

CESD

-

-

-

.270

-.450**

.044

.159

-.002

.184

ThreatEndorse

-

-

-

-

-.277

-.036

.236

.340*

.159

BenignEndorse

-

-

-

-

-

.108

-.584*

-.206

.077

AttnBias

-

-

-

-

-

-

.121

.029

-.053

STAI-State

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

.462**

-.130

Peak SUDS

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

.232

SpeechLength

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01

3.1.1

Interpretation bias scores
Data from trials with reaction times greater than 2 standard deviations above the

participant’s mean reaction time were considered outliers and excluded from analyses. Two
scores were computed for each participant – threat endorsement and benign endorsement. Threat
endorsement scores were calculated by taking the sum of threatening word-sentence pairs
identified as related and dividing by the total number of threatening word-sentence pairs,
resulting in a percentage for each participant. Benign endorsement scores were calculated in the
same way using benign word-sentence pairs.
3.1.2

Attention bias scores
Data from trials with errors were excluded from analyses. Reaction times less than 200

ms and greater than two standard deviations above the participant’s mean reaction time were
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considered outliers and excluded from analyses. Attention bias scores were calculated by
subtracting average reaction time to probes following neutral faces from average reaction time
when problems follow threatening faces (MacLeod and Mathews, 1988). Bias scores represent
an average reaction time across trials, with positive scores indicating vigilance and negative
scores indicating avoidance.
3.2

Results of analyses
A series of linear multiple regressions was conducted to test the hypotheses that

interpretation bias (measured as percentages of threat endorsement and of benign endorsement)
and attention bias (measured by the dot-probe score) would differentially predict symptom
severity (measured by the LSAS fear and avoidance scales), situational social anxiety (measured
by peak SUDS rating and the STAI-state) and behavioral avoidance (measured by speech length
in seconds). Depression was controlled for by including CESD scores as a covariate in all
regressions. Either symptom severity or situational anxiety (depending on the outcome variable)
was also included as a covariate, so that results would more strongly reflect the type of anxiety
being examined (i.e., state or trait).
3.2.1

Symptom severity
Two linear multiple regressions were conducted to test the hypothesis that interpretation

bias and attention bias would be significantly related to symptom severity. Interpretation bias
(threat endorsement and benign endorsement) and attention bias were the predictor variables and
LSAS fear and LSAS avoidance were the outcome variables, with depression and situational
anxiety included as covariates (see Tables 3 and 4). For both fear and avoidance models, R2
differed significantly from zero (F(6,25)=16.135, p<.01, R2 =.795; F(6,25)=9.122, p<.01,
R2 =.686, respectively). Two variables made significant independent contributions to the
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variance; one was the CES-D score included as a covariate. The second, as predicted, was the
percentage of threatening word-sentence pairs endorsed. These results suggest that a greater
threat interpretation bias is related to greater symptom severity, while controlling for attention
bias. Contrary to study hypotheses, attention bias was not significantly related to fear or
avoidance.
Table 3: Multiple regression with variables predicting LSAS Fear scores (N=32)
B
SE B
β
p
95% CI
CESD

.862

.151

.618

<.001

.550-1.173

STAI-State

.007

.199

.004

.974

-.403-.416

Peak SUDS

-3.143

1.666

-.220

.071

-6.573-.287

AttnBias

-.083

.110

-.070

.459

-.310-.144

ThreatEndorse

36.298

9.982

.382

.001

15.738-56.857

BenignEndorse

-23.128

13.156

-.231

.091

-50.222-3.966

Note. R2 =.795, adjusted R2 =.745

Table 4: Multiple regression with variables predicting LSAS avoidance scores (N=32)
B
SE B
β
p
95% CI
CESD

.730

.177

.552

.000

.365-1.095

STAI-State

.059

.233

.038

.801

-.421-.540

Peak SUDS

-3.132

1.953

-.231

.121

-7.155-.891

AttnBias

-.084

.129

-.074

.523

-.350-.182

ThreatEndorse

32.686

11.707

.363

.010

8.575-56.798

BenignEndorse

-21.946

15.429

-.231

.167

-53.722-9.829

Note. R2 =.686, adjusted R2 = .611
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3.2.2

Situational anxiety
Two linear multiple regressions were conducted to test the hypothesis that interpretation

bias and attention bias would be significantly related to situational anxiety. Two outcome
variables were used to examine situational anxiety—highest or peak SUDs rating and the STAIstate score (see Tables 5 and 6). When CES-D score, symptom severity, and STAI-state score
were covaried, the overall model for predicting peak SUDS was significant; R2 differed
significantly from zero (F(6,25)=3.719, p<.01, R2 = .472) and one variable made a significant
independent contribution to the variance: the percentage of threat word-sentence pairs endorsed.
When the STAI-state score was used as the outcome variable and peak SUDS was covaried
along with CES-D score and symptom severity, R2 differed significantly from zero
(F(6,25)=3.070, p=.022, R2 =.424) and one variable made a significant independent contribution
to the variance: the percentage of benign word-sentence pairs endorsed. These results suggest
that a weaker benign interpretation bias is related to greater general state anxiety following the
speech task, while a stronger threat interpretation bias is related to greater anxiety during a
socially stressful task, when controlling for attention bias. Contrary to study hypotheses,
attention bias was not significantly related to situational anxiety, as measured by peak SUDS or
by general state anxiety following the speech task.
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Table 5: Multiple regression with variables predictiing peak SUDS scores (N=32)
B
SE B
β
p
95% CI
CESD

.015

.026

.152

.568

-.038-.067

LSASfear

-.040

.021

-.567

.071

-.083-.004

STAI-State

.024

.022

.204

.286

-.021-.069

AttnBias

-.007

.012

-.088

.561

-.033-.018

ThreatEndorse

3.539

1.192

.532

.007

1.083-5.995

BenignEndorse

-2.906

1.455

-.414

.057

-5.902-.091

Note. R2 =.472, adjusted R2 = .345

Table 6: Multiple regression with variables predicting STAI-State scores (N=32)
B
SE B
β
p
95% CI
CESD

-.097

.230

-.116

.677

-.570-.376

LSASfear

.007

.201

.011

.974

-.407-.421

Peak SUDS

1.907

1.748

.223

.286

-1.693-5.507

Tbias

.112

.110

.158

.315

-.114-.338

ThreatEndorse

2.770

12.392

.049

.825

-22.752-28.292

BenignEndorse

-31.605

12.508

-.525

.018

-57.366—5.844

Note. R2 =.424, adjusted R2 =.286

3.2.3

Behavioral avoidance
A linear multiple regression was conducted to examine the hypothesis that both

interpretation bias and attention bias would be significantly related to behavioral avoidance,
which was measured by speech length in seconds (see Table 7). When CES-D score was
covaried, the overall model for predicting speech length was not significant (F(5,28)=.596,
p=.703, R2 =.096). The results suggest that, contrary to study hypotheses, neither interpretation
bias nor attention bias are significantly related to behavioral avoidance.
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Table 7: Multiple regression with variables predicting speech length (N=32)
B
SE B
β
p
95% CI
CESD

3.902

3.121

.254

.221

-2.480-10.285

AttnBias

-1.093

2.309

-.085

.639

-5.814-3.629

ThreatEndorse

145.801

192.809

.140

.456

-248.538-540.140

BenignEndorse

232.930

202.180

.232

.259

-180.575-646.435

Note. Speech length measured in seconds. Overall model was not significant

3.2.4

Exploratory Analyses
A series of post-hoc regression analyses were conducted to examine alternative indices of

constructs of interest. Audience ratings of participants’ speech quality and how anxious the
speakers looked were used as measures of behavior and included as outcome variables. In
addition, both attention bias towards positive faces and an attention bias variability index were
used as measures of attention bias and included as independent variables.
Audience ratings of speech quality and anxiety appearance: When completing the BAT,
participants were rated by 2-3 audience members on how good the talk was and how anxious the
speaker was using a 0 to 10 Likert scale. Mean ratings across audience members were calculated
to form a speech quality score and anxious appearance score for each participant. These variables
served as markers of behavior.
Attention bias towards positive faces: Positive attention bias scores were calculated by
subtracting average reaction time to probes following neutral faces from average reaction time
when probes follow positive faces. Bias scores represent an average reaction time across trials,
with positive scores indicating vigilance and negative scores indicating avoidance.
Attention bias variability index: An attention bias variability (ABV) index represents
intrasession variability as a marker of attentional control impairment and inconsistency of
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response to threatening stimuli, and has been previously validated as an index of attention bias
(Iacoviello et al., 2014). ABV index scores were calculated by first dividing dot-probe trials into
bins of 20 sequential trials and then calculating threat bias scores for each bin. The standard
deviation of the threat bias scores was calculated across all bins and divided by the individual’s
mean RT to all critical trials (threat-neutral pair trials) (Price et al., 2014) to determine the ABV.
The first series of exploratory regression analyses were conducted to examine whether
interpretation bias (measured by threat endorsement and benign endorsement scores) and
attention bias (measured by threat bias scores)would be significantly related to behavior
(measured by speech quality and anxious appearance). The overall model predicting audience
ratings of speech quality was not significant (F(5,27)= 1.15, p= .364, R2 =.207). In addition, the
overall model predicting audience ratings of anxious appearance was not significant (F(5,27)=
1.21, p= .378, R2 =.203).
The second series of regression analyses were conducted to examine whether attention
bias towards positive faces (instead of attention bias towards threatening faces) would be
significantly related to symptom severity (measured by the LSAS fear and avoidance scales),
situational social anxiety (measured by peak SUDS rating and the STAI-state) and behavioral
avoidance (measured by speech length in seconds, audience ratings of speech performance, and
audience ratings of anxious appearance), when interpretation bias was also included as an
independent variable. Depression was controlled for by including CESD scores as a covariate in
all regressions. When CESD score and interpretation bias scores were controlled for, positive
attention bias was not significantly related to symptom severity (LSAS fear and avoidance:β= .164, t(27)= -1.502, p= .148;β= .-.139, t(27)= -1.012, p= .323) or situational anxiety (peak
SUDS and STAI-state:β= -.094, t(29)= -.471, p= .642;β= -.319, t(27)= -1.931, p= .067). In
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addition, the overall models predicting behavioral outcomes were not significant; speech length
(F(5,29)=1.030, p=.423, R2 =.177), speech quality (F(5,26)= 1.368, p=.276, R2 =.246), and
anxious appearance (F(5,26)= 1.234, p=.338, R2 =.227). These results are consistent with the
primary results of the study, which used threat bias scores as an index of attention bias.
The final series of exploratory of regression analyses were conducted to examine whether
attention bias variability (instead of threat bias) would be significantly related to symptom
severity (measured by the LSAS fear and avoidance scales), situational social anxiety (measured
by peak SUDS rating and the STAI-state) and behavioral avoidance (measured by speech length
in seconds, speech quality, and anxious appearance), when interpretation bias was also included
as an independent. Depression was controlled for by including CESD scores as a covariate in all
regressions. When CESD score and interpretation bias scores were controlled for, ABV was not
significantly related to symptom severity (LSAS fear and avoidance:β= .089, t(28)= .867, p=
.396;β= .120, t(28)= .957, p= .349) or situational anxiety (peak SUDS and STAI-state:β= .256,
t(28)= .1.427, p= .166;β= .093, t(28)= .536, p= .597). In addition, the overall models predicting
behavioral outcomes were not significant; speech length (F(5,30)=.627, p=.681, R2 =.111),
speech quality (F(5,27)= .653, p=.662, R2 =.129), and anxious appearance (F(5,27)= 1.155,
p=.362, R2 =.208). These results are consistent with the primary results of the study, which used
threat bias scores as an index of attention bias.
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4

DISCUSSION

The current study examined the associations of both interpretation bias and attention bias
with symptom severity, situational social anxiety, and behavioral avoidance in adults with social
phobia. Results indicated that there were distinct associations between the two types of biases
and social anxiety, as indexed by some, but not all measures. A clear link was found between
interpretation bias and social anxiety but, contrary to expectations, not between attention bias
and social anxiety. More specifically, interpretation bias was related to both symptom severity
(LSAS fear and avoidance) and situational anxiety (SUDS ratings and STAI-state), while
attention bias was not significantly associated with any measure of anxiety. In addition, neither
interpretation nor attention biases were related to behavioral avoidance, operationalized as
speech length during an impromptu speech task.
In the following sections, I examine more closely both the significant findings with
regard to interpretation biases and the null findings for attention biases. In doing so, I attempt to
integrate the present results into both the social anxiety and the broader anxiety literatures. I also
suggest theoretical models that provide a context for understanding and interpreting the observed
pattern of findings. I conclude by discussing limitations of the current study and suggesting
future directions for research on cognitive biases and social anxiety.
4.1

Interpretation bias and anxiety
The key finding of the current study is a pattern of significant and distinct associations

between interpretation bias and both symptom severity and situational anxiety. Specifically,
greater endorsement of threat word-sentence pairs, or a threat bias, was significantly related to
both self-reported fear and avoidance symptomology, as well as to peak anxiety while giving a
speech. In addition, less endorsement of benign sentence-word pairs, or a lack of a benign bias,
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was significantly related to self-reported state anxiety immediately after giving a speech.
In the current study, symptomology was operationalized as self-reported trait social
anxiety and general behavioral avoidance. Scores from the LSAS fear and avoidance scales,
which have been used to measure social anxiety over time (Heimberg, 1999) and to distinguish
between clinical and sub-clinical levels of social anxiety (Mennin, 2002), served as the basis for
the operational definition of trait social anxiety. The LSAS has added advantages in that it has
been widely used to capture general social anxiety in research contexts and often serves as an
outcome measure in treatment studies (Heimberg 1999). To capture state or situational social
anxiety, I used a peak SUDS rating during an impromptu speech and the STAI-state scale, which
participants completed immediately after the speech. These measures provided estimates of state
anxiety.
Observed associations between interpretation biases and anxiety indices differed across
measures that capture anxiety over varying time courses (trait vs. state). The the present results
suggest that whereas an interpretation bias for threat relates both to enduring trait anxiety and to
anxiety experienced transiently (in the moment), failure to produce benign interpretations is
related more narrowly to anxiety in the moment.
This pattern is consistent with previous research that has linked clinical social anxiety
with an online and offline negative interpretation bias (e.g., Amir & Bomyea, 2010) as well as a
lack of an online benign bias (e.g., Hirsch & Mathews, 2000), even using the same WSAP task
(Amir et al., 2012). It is also consistent with findings from Huppert and colleagues (2007),
which indicated a negative interpretation bias in socially phobic and non-socially phobic anxious
individuals (at both high and low social anxiety levels), but a lack of a positive bias only in those
with high levels of social anxiety. These biases were present at both the interpretation generation
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phase (i.e., providing more negative interpretations and less non-threatening ones) and the
interpretation selection phase (i.e., endorsing more negative interpretations and less nonthreatening ones). The authors interpreted these findings, along with previous studies, as support
for a time course of processing that may shift from a presence of chronic threat bias to a lack of
an online benign bias and presence of a threat bias to the presence of a negative appraisal of the
self. The current findings, in which negative interpretation relates to characteristic and situational
social anxiety and the lack of benign interpretation relates to situational anxiety, seem consistent
with this theory. The current study extends prior work by suggesting that lack of benign bias is
linked to state, but not to trait, anxiety in a diagnosed socially anxious sample.
The current study’s evidence of specific associations between social anxiety and each
type of interpretation bias is consistent with previous research findings suggesting that social
anxiety involves both a presence of threat bias and a lack of benign bias (e.g., Amir, Prouvost, &
Kuckertz, 2012; Beard & Amir, 2009; Hirsch & Mathews, 2000). In a non-clinical sample,
Beard and Amir (2009) found that high socially anxious individuals endorsed more social threat
interpretations and fewer benign interpretations than non-anxious controls, using the WSAP task
administered in the present study. Furthermore, in Beard and Amir’s (2009) study, although
socially anxious individuals endorsed threatening interpretation and non-threatening
interpretations at equal rates (consistent with the present study’s findings), the speeds at which
they endorsed each type of interpretation correlated positively and negatively with social anxiety,
respectively.
The comparable endorsement rates for threatening and benign interpretations found in the
current and Beard and Amir (2009) studies, but not in other research (e.g., Amin et al., 1998;
Stopa & Clark, 2000) may, at least in part, reflect differences in methodology. For example, in
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the WSAP task used in both the present study and Beard and Amir’s (2009) work, participants
decide only whether a word and sentence are related. They do not, as participants have been
asked to do in related research, choose whether one word (e.g., "bored") is more closely related
to a sentence (e.g., "A person yawns during your speech") than another (e.g., "tired"). As such,
one method allows for the measurement of endorsement of both negative and benign
interpretations, while the other only allows for the measurement of preference of one over the
other. Therefore, in studies that utilize measurement of preference, it would be impossible to
obtain equal endorsement rates because only one option (negative or neutral) can be selected.
Regardless, however, of the role that study methodology plays in shaping the pattern of
associations observed, the emergence of distinct relationships between anxiety and threat and
benign biases suggests, as Beard and Amir (2009) noted, that there is value in treating these bias
types as separate constructs, which other researchers have done in related studies (Huppert, Foa,
Furr, Filip, & Mathews, 2003). The current findings lend credence to this assertion.
Thus, the current findings suggest that cultivation of benign biases may be just as
important in efforts to decrease anxiety, particularly anxiety in the moment, as the reduction of
threat biases, which is more commonly a focus of intervention. Indeed, cognitive bias
modification studies that have measured state and/or trait anxiety have shown that inducing a
benign interpretation bias results in reduced trait anxiety (measured by the STAI-trait) in anxious
individuals (Mathews, Ridgeway, Cook, & Yiend, 2007). Similarly, induction of a benign
interpretation bias has been linked to decreases in state anxiety (measured by the STAI-state) in a
non-clinical community sample adults (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000).
Finally, in addition to lending support to prior findings, the current study advances the
literature by suggesting, consistent with cognitive theories, that affect, particularly anxiety, is an
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influential force in shaping higher level cognitive processes, such as interpretation of
information. For example, cognitive models suggest that people sampled from the general
population tend to interpret self-relevant information as more positive than it may objectively be
(Alicke et al., 1995). Put simply, they have positive interpretation biases, which are likely
informed by their beliefs or expectations about the world around them (Dagmar Stahlberg,
1999). This bias pattern stands in contrast to that observed in socially anxious individuals who
appear to be primed, due to long-standing or pre-existing fears of negative evaluation, to
interpret self-relevant information as negative rather than as positive or benign. In other words,
socially anxious individuals seem to be “wired” with a negative interpretation bias that their nonanxious peers do not have (e.g., Amir & Bomyea, 2010).
Thus, not only do socially anxious individuals typically default to negative interpretations
of social stimuli in general, but also, under stressful situations (when state anxiety is high), such
negative interpretations may be especially accessible for them. The current study’s findings are
consistent with this assertion because endorsement of negative interpretations was positively
related to situational anxiety and endorsement of benign interpretations was inversely (or
negatively) related to situational anxiety. Further, people with social anxiety may preferentially
select such interpretations, even when they are able to identify or generate appropriate benign or
positive alternatives. Indeed, previous studies have found socially anxious individuals to endorse
negative interpretations for ambiguous social scenarios as more readily accessible and more
believable, even when neutral and positive interpretations were made available to them (Amin,
Foa, & Coles, 1998; Stopa & Clark, 2000).
In sum, the current findings regarding interpretation bias are consistent with two key
points. First, they suggest that individuals with social phobia may be able to generate more non-
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threatening interpretations as easily as they do threatening interpretations; however, they are less
likely to select them to guide their behavior during anxiety-provoking situations. Second, these
findings are consistent with predictions based on theories about the influence of affect on social
information processing and suggest that enduring and situational manifestations of anxiety
exercise particular influences over information processing in socially anxious individuals.
4.2

Attention bias and anxiety
The failure to detect a significant relationship between attention bias and symptom

severity and situational anxiety in a clinical sample is unexpected, though not unprecedented.
While many studies have yielded findings that indicate the presence of a significant attention
bias either towards or away from threatening stimuli in socially anxious individuals (e.g., BarHaim et al., 2007; Spasori & Rapee, 2007; Chen et al., 2002), a few earlier studies have not
found significant attention biases, particularly in non-clinical samples (Bradley et al., 1997;
Pineles & Mineka, 2005). Given that the current study used a clinical sample and administered a
facial dot-probe task used in much of the prior research, it is notable that no significant
associations with anxiety symptoms or avoidance were evident. This may lend credence to
Schultz and Heimberg’s (2008) assertion that socially anxious individuals direct attention to both
external cues (consistent with a vigilant stance) and internal cues (consistent with an avoidant
stance) throughout a social situation, an idea that was not possible to detect using the current
study’s methodology but clearly warrants closer examination.
Indeed, a hypervigilance-avoidance hypothesis has been proposed in previous work (e.g.,
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988; Mogg & Bradley, 1998), which states that
attentional bias is a dynamic process, rather than a static response pattern. According to this
hypothesis, people are first vigilant to external threat cues. They then direct attention away from

43

the threat to avoid detailed processing and to minimize anxiety. One study tested this hypothesis
by tracking eye movements during presentation of paired threatening and neutral cues and found
that individuals with higher levels of social anxiety were faster to attend to threat cues but looked
at them more briefly than did individuals with lower levels of social anxiety. The authors
interpreted these results as consistent with a vigilant-avoidant pattern of bias (Garner, Mogg, &
Bradley, 2006). Although some participants’ data may have been consistent with this idea, the
model did not fit all of the participants’ data (i.e., some had avoidant scores). Thus, it may be
that the course of attention to external and internal cues varies amongst individuals with social
anxiety.
The null attention bias findings in the current study may also reflect within-sample
variability in attention bias scores, which ranged from -25.50 to 42.53. Given that some
participants showed avoidant biases (negative bias scores) and others showed hypervigilant
biases (positive bias scores), the present sample could comprise members of both of Calamaras
and colleagues’ (2012) proposed attentional subtypes for socially anxious individuals. Thus, the
decision in the present study to treat attention bias scores as varying along a single continuum
may have obscured distinct relations between attention bias and social anxiety that might be
evident for each subtype. For example, among attentionally vigilant people with social anxiety,
associations between bias scores and symptom measures might emerge only for indices of fear,
while among attentionally avoidant people, such associations might emerge only for indices of
behavioral avoidance.
To date, no published study has examined differential associations between bias scores
for individuals who display different attention bias subtypes and social anxiety symptomology.
Price and colleagues (2011) found no significant differences between subtypes in total LSAS
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scores; however, they did not look at differences between subtypes on fear and avoidance
subscale scores, nor did they conduct correlational analyses within subtype groups. Although the
current study was inadequately powered to examine subtype groups separately, inspection of
individual threat bias scores indicated that 10 of the 34 participants had negative scores,
suggesting an avoidant bias. Future research using larger samples would allow for analyses in
which participants are grouped based on bias type.
4.3

Behavioral avoidance
The absence of significant associations between behavioral avoidance during an

impromptu speech and both interpretation and attention biases was unexpected. One possible
explanation is that a single “snapshot” of avoidance, even under circumstances—like the BAT—
that are likely to elicit such behavior, may be inadequate to elicit or capture such associations, if
they are indeed present. Rather than engaging in behavioral avoidance in every anxietyprovoking situation, socially anxious individuals may, on average, avoid situations more often
than non-anxious individuals. Therefore it may be that research focused on patterns of
avoidance over time (e.g., if people continuously interpret party environments negatively, they
will develop a pattern of avoiding parties) would be more likely to yield evidence of associations
with cognitive biases.
Alternatively, a few methodological issues may have contributed to the null
findings with regard to behavioral avoidance. First, a single- variable measurement of behavioral
avoidance, in this case speech length, may not be adequate to capture the hypothesized
associations. Instead, cognitive biases may be related to other, and perhaps more subtle,
behavioral manifestations of avoidance such as lack of eye contact or speaking speed. For
example, if a socially anxious individual interprets an audience member’s yawn as boredom

45

rather than tiredness, she may cut her talk short. Alternatively, someone who interprets the
audience as disapproving may attempt to explain himself and end up rambling or fumbling with
his words. Indeed, previous research has shown that socially anxious individuals not only escape
social situations sooner than non-anxious individuals but also engage in other forms of avoidance
such as engaging in less eye contact, speaking faster or skipping material (e.g., Baker &
Edelmann, 2002; Voncken & Bögels, 2008) compared to non-anxious controls. Future research
would benefit from treating behavioral avoidance as a multifaceted construct that may have
complex and varied relationships with cognitive processes.
Further, the chosen behavioral avoidance task version may not have optimally elicited
behavioral avoidance. In the current study, all participants completed the same impromptu
speech task and were provided with the same topics to choose from. Although the task seemed
likely to be personally relevant for each participant (all participants endorsed public speaking
fears), previous research recommends personalized stimulus situations for BATs (e.g., a
conversation, presenting material at a meeting) (Chiauzzi, Heimberg, Becker, & Gansler, 1985),
which may provide a more relevant or accurate observation of the individual’s behavioral
repertoire. For example, Heimberg and colleagues (1993) found that individuals who had
received cognitive behavioral group therapy for social phobia received lower anxiety ratings and
better performance ratings by independent judges on an individually-tailored behavioral test
compared to those who received educational-supportive therapy. They also reported less anxiety
during the behavioral test after treatment.
Finally, it may have been important to consider self-focused negative interpretations
when examining associations between interpretation biases and behavioral outcome. Indeed,
previous research has posited that the reduction of negative self-statements may play a role in
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behavior change (Kendall & Hollon, 1981). Therefore, a self-specific negative interpretation
(e.g., “I look shaky and nervous”) versus an environment- focused negative interpretation (e.g.,
“That person looks bored”) may be more relevant to behavioral avoidance.
Indeed, research has shown that socially anxious individuals endorse more negative selfstatements than non-socially anxious individuals and that negative self-statement endorsement is
significantly correlated to anxiety levels and performance skill during a social interaction task
(Glass et al., 1982). Thus, it is likely that a negative self-bias in a given situation will be more
tightly linked to behavior than will a general negative interpretation bias. In the current study,
interpretation bias was measured by examining the number of threat-sentences pair endorsed for
a variety of ambiguous situations (e.g., “You share an idea with someone”), rather than
examining the number of negative self-statements endorsed. Similarly, it may be that general
trait negative interpretations (e.g., measured in general or not specifically during an anxiety
provoking situation) may not be directly related to avoidant behavior; instead behavior may be
more closely related to specific negative interpretations exhibited in the moment. The current
study measured interpretation bias prior to the impromptu task.
4.4

Limitations and strengths of the present study
The current study is not without limitations. First, the sample was small, primarily

female, and relatively young (mean age =23). Results of a power analysis, which determined
that a sample of 34 should be sufficient to detect expected effect sizes, suggest that the small
number of participants is not necessarily problematic, although it may have been a contributing
factor to the null behavioral findings. The homogeneity of the sample limits generalizability of
findings to the broader social phobic population. Although this study provides an important
initial examination of both interpretation bias and attention bias and their distinct relations to

47

behavior, it should be replicated, particularly in light of the small and somewhat homogenous
sample.
Second, the current study utilized cross-sectional data from a single laboratory
assessment. Therefore, consistency of the associations found could not be determined (i.e., do
these relational patterns exist at any given moment or do they change). Future research that
includes longitudinal methodology would be beneficial in order to examine the reliability of
relational patterns of interest over time.
Despite these limitations, this study has notable strengths, including being the first to
examine separately the relations between interpretation bias and attention bias and behavior in a
clinically socially anxious sample. The findings suggest that interpretation bias, but not attention
bias, is related to both enduring and situational anxiety in social phobia. Future research is
needed to better understand in what ways interpretation bias relates to both social anxiety and
behavior.
4.5

Future directions
The current study’s findings (both significant and null) provide a foundation for several

avenues of future research. First, the pattern of significant associations between interpretation
bias (both threat and lack of benign bias) and social anxiety (trait versus state) is informative
because they suggest that when considering treatments for social anxiety, not only it is important
to challenge and reduce negative biases, but it is also useful to teach skills for producing
alternative benign interpretations, particularly in stressful moments. Indeed, results of cognitive
bias modification studies for social anxiety suggest that increasing familiarity with and access to
benign interpretations can help reduce anxiety symptoms (Beard & Amir, 2008).
There may thus be value, as Beard and Amir (2009) propose, in extending current bias
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modification paradigms to include training in the generation and selection of benign
interpretations, particularly during anxiety-provoking social situations. One study found
cognitive bias modification that involved increasing benign interpretations to be superior to
computerized cognitive behavior therapy at maintaining a positive cognitive bias during a high
mental load task (unscrambling socially relevant sentences while remembering a six digit
number), in individuals with high social anxiety (Bowler et al., 2012). Therefore, further
exploration of potential benefits associated with including benign interpretation training during
exposure might be one avenue for future treatment work. For example, having an individual
practice producing benign interpretations (e.g., “That person is checking his phone because he
got an important text, not because I am giving a bad speech”) while in a stressful situation could
potentially enhance exposure treatment outcomes.
Currently, the literature on cognitive behavioral therapy suggests that the addition of
cognitive treatment techniques, such as restructuring, do not necessarily have any added value
towards enhancing outcomes beyond that which exposure provides (e.g., Emmelkamp, Mersch,
Vissia, & van der Helm, 1985; Feske & Chambless, 1995; Longmore & Worrell, 2007).
However, most cognitive components of therapy focus on challenging or reducing negative
cognitions prior to exposure; rarely do they focus on generating benign interpretations during
exposure. Further, therapists typically spend little time (e.g., one or two sessions) on these
techniques (Longmore, 2007).
It may be that these cognitive components seem are unnecessary because they are not
explicitly practiced during exposure, which research has identified as a key mechanism of
change in CBT for anxiety (Nortje, Posthumus, & Moller, 2008). It may also be that brief
cognitive training is inadequate to affect long-standing negative beliefs (Longmore, 2007). The
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present findings, however, add to a growing literature, which suggests instead that focusing on
enhancing exposure sessions with on-line benign interpretation training could actually render
treatment more effective.
Additional exposure-enhancing benefits could accrue from focusing on benign
interpretation training under stress to the point of automaticity prior to exposure (i.e.,
computerized training with the knowledge of exposure immediately afterwards), so that
individuals do not resort to old tendencies when faced with stressful cues. Indeed, exposure may
be more effective when combined with benign interpretation training because anxious
individuals treated with this combination will not only learn that they can tolerate their anxiety,
but they may also be more likely to have corrective or positive experiences during exposure due
to more accessible benign or positive thoughts (e.g., “That went well” vs. “I guess I was able to
do that this time”). Not only might this combination be more reinforcing than exposure alone,
but it could also lead clients to require fewer exposure sessions to achieve symptom reduction or
result in longer-lasting treatment gains (e.g., relapse prevention). This is one theory that may
warrant future research.
Second, the current findings support further examination of interpretation bias and
its associations with symptomology (both subjectively-reported anxiety levels and behavior),
with particular emphasis on the temporal contexts in which interpretation biases may arise.
Therefore, in order to further elucidate the patterns of associations found in the current study, it
would be beneficial for future research to examine individually generated, on-line interpretations
in socially anxious individuals (e.g., asking participants how they are interpreting audience
members’ behaviors while they giving a speech). It may also be worthwhile for future research to
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include measures of interpretation that are not social anxiety specific (e.g., other anxiety specific
situations to interpret) as well as examine these relations in other anxiety disorders.
Finally, given the unexpected null findings in the current study and the inconsistencies in
the current literature regarding associations between attention bias and both anxiety and
behavior, a more thorough and detailed understanding of attention bias patterns in social anxiety
is needed. One direction for future research may be to include eye-tracking methodology to
measure attention bias over the course of a task (e.g., facial dot-probe) or social situation (e.g.,
speech task). Future research may also benefit from utilizing BATs that may yield more valid
measures of behavioral avoidance. Such BATs might be individually tailored (e.g., conversation
versus speech) or might include more indices of avoidance (e.g., eye contact, speech speed).
4.6

Conclusions
The current study is the first to our knowledge to have examined the independent

associations between interpretation bias and attention bias and social anxiety symptomology,
situational anxiety, and behavioral avoidance in a sample of adults with social phobia. Key
findings revealed significant associations between negative interpretation bias and both trait and
state social anxiety and a significant relationship between lack of benign interpretation bias and
state anxiety. There were no significant associations between attention bias and anxiety or
behavioral avoidance. The findings are consistent with both social anxiety and cognitive
processing theories and contribute to the literature by highlighting the importance of benign or
positive interpretation bias in social phobia. They also suggest distinct links of negative and
positive interpretation bias to both state and trait anxiety. Examining the contribution of online
benign interpretation training to treatment programs for social anxiety (e.g., cognitive bias
modification, exposure therapy) in future research may be warranted.

51

52

REFERENCES
Alicke, M. D. (1985). Global self-evaluation as determined by the desirability and
controllability of trait adjectives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49(6),
1621–1630. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.49.6.1621
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental
disorders (5th ed.). Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing.
Amin, N., Foa, E. B., & Coles, M. E. (1998). Negative interpretation bias in social phobia.
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36(10), 945–957. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S00057967(98)00060-6
Amir, N., Beard, C., & Bower, E. (2005). Interpretation bias and social anxiety. Cognitive
Therapy and Research, 29(4), 433–443. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10608-005-2834-5
Amir, N., Beard, C., Taylor, C. T., Klumpp, H., Elias, J., Burns, M., & Chen, X. (2009).
Attention training in individuals with generalized social phobia: A randomized controlled
trial. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 77(5), 961.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0016685
Amir, N., & Bomyea, J. (2010). Cognitive biases in social anxiety disorder. Social Anxiety:
Clinical, Developmental, and Social Perspectives, 373–394.
Amir, N., Prouvost, C., & Kuckertz, J. M. (2012). Lack of a benign interpretation bias in social
anxiety disorder. Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, 41(2), 119–129.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16506073.2012.662655
Baker, S. R., & Edelmann, R. J. (2002). Is social phobia related to lack of social skills? Duration
of skill-related behaviours and ratings of behavioural adequacy. The British Journal of
Clinical Psychology / the British Psychological Society, 41(Pt 3), 243–257.

53

Bar-Haim, Y., Lamy, D., Pergamin, L., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J., & van IJzendoorn, M. H.
(2007). Threat-related attentional bias in anxious and nonanxious individuals: a metaanalytic study. Psychological Bulletin, 133(1), 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/00332909.133.1.1
Basco, M. R., Bostic, J. Q., Davies, D., Rush, A. J., Witte, B., Hendrickse, W., & Barnett, V.
(2000). Methods to improve diagnostic accuracy in a community mental health setting.
American Journal of Psychiatry, 157(10), 1599–1605.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.157.10.1599
Beard, C., & Amir, N. (2008). A multi-session interpretation modification program: Changes in
interpretation and social anxiety symptoms. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46(10),
1135–1141. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2008.05.012
Beard, C., & Amir, N. (2009). Interpretation in social anxiety: when meaning precedes
ambiguity. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 33(4), 406–415.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10608-009-9235-0
Beard, C., Weisberg, R., & Amir, N. (2011). Combined cognitive bias modification treatment for
social anxiety disorder: a pilot trial. Depression and Anxiety, 28, 981-988.
Beck, A. T., & Clark, D. A. (1997). An information processing model of anxiety: Automatic and
strategic processes. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35(1), 49–58.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7967(96)00069-1
Beck, A. T., Emery, G., & Greenberg, R. L. (2005). Anxiety disorders and phobias: A cognitive
perspective. New York, NY, US: Basic Books. Retrieved from
http://ezproxy.gsu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=t
rue&db=psyh&AN=2006-01301-000&site=ehost- live&scope=site

54

Beidel, D. C., Turner, S. M., Jacob, R. G., & Cooley, M. R. (1989). Assessment of social phobia:
Reliability of an impromptu speech task. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 3(3), 149–158.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0887-6185(89)90009-1
Bowler, J. O., Mackintosh, B., Dunn, B. D., Mathews, A., Dalgleish, T., & Hoppitt, L. (2012). A
comparison of cognitive bias modification for interpretation and computerized cognitive
behavior therapy: Effects on anxiety, depression, attentional control, and interpretive
bias. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 80(6), 1021–1033.
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0029932
Bradley, B. P., Mogg, K., Falla, S. J., & Hamilton, L. R. (1998). Attentional bias for threatening
facial expressions in anxiety: Manipulation of stimulus duration. Cognition & Emotion,
12(6), 737–753. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/026999398379411
Bradley, B. P., Mogg, K., Millar, N., Bonham-Carter, C., Fergusson, E., Jenkins, J., & Parr, M.
(1997). Attentional biases for emotional faces. Cognition & Emotion, 11(1), 25–42.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/026999397380014
Bradley, B. P., Mogg, K., White, J., Groom, C., & Bono, J. (1999). Attentional bias for
emotional faces in generalized anxiety disorder. British Journal of Clinical Psychology,
38(3), 267–278. http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/014466599162845
Brosan, L., Hoppitt, L., Shelfer, L., Sillence, A., & Mackintosh, B. (2011). Cognitive bias
modification for attention and interpretation reduces trait and state anxiety in anxious
patients referred to an out-patient service: Results from a pilot study. Journal of Behavior
Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 42(3), 258–264.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbtep.2010.12.006
Bunnell, B. E., Beidel, D. C., & Mesa, F. (2013). A randomized trial of attention training for

55

generalized social phobia: Does attention training change social behavior? Behavior
Therapy. Retrieved from
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0005789413000452
Calamaras, M. R., Tone, E. B., & Anderson, P. L. (2012). A pilot study of attention bias
subtypes: Examining their relation to cognitive bias and their change following cognitive
behavioral therapy. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 68(7), 745–754.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jclp.21875
Cannon, W. B. (1929). Bodily changes in pain, hunger, fear and rage. Oxford, England:
Appleton.
Carlbring, P., Apelstrand, M., Sehlin, H., Amir, N., Rousseau, A., Hofmann, S. G., & Andersson,
G. (2012). Internet-delivered attention bias modification training in individuals with
social anxiety disorder-a double blind randomized controlled trial. BMC Psychiatry,
12(1), 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1471-244X-12-66
Chen, Y. P., Ehlers, A., Clark, D. M., & Mansell, W. (2002). Patients with generalized social
phobia direct their attention away from faces. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40(6),
677–687. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7967(01)00086-9
Chiauzzi, E. J., Heimberg, R. G., Becker, R. E., & Gansler, D. (1985). Personalized versus
standard role plays in the assessment of depressed patients’ social skill. Journal of
Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 7(2), 121–133.
http://doi.org/10.1007/BF00961078
Clark, D. M., & Wells, A. (1995). A cognitive model of social phobia. In R. G. Heimberg, M. R.
Liebowitz, D. A. Hope, & F. R. Schneier (Eds.), Social phobia: Diagnosis, assessment,
and treatment. (pp. 69–93). New York, NY US: Guilford Press.

56

Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. (2003). Applied multiple regression/correlation
analysis for the behavioral sciences (3rd ed.). Mahwah, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates Publishers.
Coles, M. E., & Heimberg, R. G. (2000). Patterns of anxious arousal during exposure to feared
situations in individuals with social phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38(4),
405–424. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7967(99)00092-3
Dagmar Stahlberg, L.-E. P. (1999). Preferences for and evaluation of self-relevant information
depending on the elaboration of the schema involved. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 29(4), 489–502. http://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)10990992(199906)29:4&lt;489::AID-EJSP940&gt;3.0.CO;2-8
Emmelkamp, P. M., Mersch, P. P., Vissia, E., & van der Helm, M. (1985). Social phobia: a
comparative evaluation of cognitive and behavioral interventions. Behaviour Research
and Therapy, 23(3), 365–369. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(85)90015-4
Eysenck, M. W., & Calvo, M. G. (1992). Anxiety and performance: The processing efficiency
theory. Cognition & Emotion, 6(6), 409–434.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699939208409696
Eysenck, M. W., & Derakshan, N. (1997). Cognitive biases for future negative events as a
function of trait anxiety and social desirability. Personality and Individual Differences,
22(5), 597–605. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(96)00258-9
Feske, U., & Chambless, D. L. (1995). Cognitive behavioral versus exposure only treatment for
social phobia: A meta-analysis. Behavior Therapy, 26(4), 695–720.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7894(05)80040-1
First, M., Spitzer, R., Gibbon, M., & Williams, J. (2002). Structured clinical interview for DSM-

57

IV axis I disorders: research version: Non-patient edition (SCID-I/NP). Structured
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders: Research Version: Non-Patient Edition
(SCID-I/NP).
Franklin, M. E., Huppert, J., Langner, R., Leiberg, S., & Foa, E. B. (2005). Interpretation bias: A
comparison of treated social phobics, untreated social phobics, and controls1. Cognitive
Therapy and Research, 29(3), 289–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10608-005-2412-8
Fresco, D. M., Coles, M. E., Heimberg, R. G., Liebowitz, M. R., Hami, S., Stein, M. B., &
Goetz, D. (2001). The Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale: a comparison of the psychometric
properties of self-report and clinician-administered formats. Psychological Medicine,
31(06), 1025–1035. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0033291701004056
Glass, C. R., Merluzzi, T. V., Biever, J. L., & Larsen, K. H. (1982). Cognitive assessment of
social anxiety: Development and validation of a self-statement questionnaire. Cognitive
Therapy and Research, 6(1), 37–55. http://doi.org/10.1007/BF01185725
Gould, R. A., Buckminster, S., Pollack, M. H., Otto, M. W., & Yap, L. (1997). Cognitivebehavioral and pharmacological treatment for social phobia: A meta-analysis. Clinical
Psychology: Science and Practice, 4(4), 291–306. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.14682850.1997.tb00123.x
Hakamata, Y., Lissek, S., Bar-Haim, Y., Britton, J. C., Fox, N. A., Leibenluft, E., … Pine, D. S.
(2010). Attention bias modification treatment: a meta-analysis toward the establishment
of novel treatment for anxiety. Biological Psychiatry, 68(11), 982–990.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2010.07.021
Hedman, E., Ljótsson, B., Rück, C., Furmark, T., Carlbring, P., Lindefors, N., & Andersson, G.

58

(2010). Internet administration of self-report measures commonly used in research on
social anxiety disorder: A psychometric evaluation. Computers in Human Behavior,
26(4), 736–740. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2010.01.010
Heeren, A., Peschard, V., & Philippot, P. (2012). The causal role of attentional bias for threat
cues in social anxiety: a test on a cyber-ostracism task. Cognitive Therapy and Research,
36(5), 512–521. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10608-011-9394-7
Heimberg, R. G., Horner, K. J., Juster, H. R., Safren, S. A., Brown, E. J., Schneier, F. R., &
others. (1999). Psychometric properties of the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale.
Psychological Medicine, 29(1), 199–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0033291798007879
Heimberg, R. G., Liebowitz, M. R., Hope, D. A., Schneier, F. R., Holt, C. S., Welkowitz, L. A.,
… Klein, D. F. (1998). Cognitive behavioral group therapy vs phenelzine therapy for
social phobia: 12-week outcome. Archives of General Psychiatry, 55(12), 1133–1141.
http://doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.55.12.1133
Hirsch, C. R., Clark, D. M., & Mathews, A. (2006). Imagery and interpretations in social phobia:
Support for the combined cognitive biases hypothesis. Behavior Therapy, 37(3), 223–
236. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2006.02.001
Hirsch, C. R., & Mathews, A. (2000). Impaired positive inferential bias in social phobia. Journal
of Abnormal Psychology, 109(4), 705. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.109.4.705
Hope, D. A., Heimberg, R. G., & Bruch, M. A. (1995). Dismantling Cognitive-Behavioral Group
Therapy for social phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33(6), 637–650.
http://doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(95)00013-N
Huppert, J. D., Foa, E. B., Furr, J. M., Filip, J. C., & Mathews, A. (2003). Interpretation bias in

59

social anxiety: A dimensional perspective. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27(5), 569–
577. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1026359105456
Huppert, J. D., Pasupuleti, R. V., Foa, E. B., & Mathews, A. (2007). Interpretation biases in
social anxiety: Response generation, response selection, and self-appraisals. Behaviour
Research and Therapy, 45(7), 1505–1515. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2007.01.006
Iacoviello B., Wu G., Abend R., Murrough J., Feder A., Fruchter E., et al. (2014): Attention bias
varaibility and symptoms of postraumatic stress disorder. Journal of Traumatic Stress,
27, 232-239. http:// doi: 10.1002/jts.21899
Kashdan, T. B. (2007). Social anxiety spectrum and diminished positive experiences: Theoretical
synthesis and meta-analysis. Clinical Psychology Review, 27(3), 348–365.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2006.12.003
Kashdan, T. B., Weeks, J. W., & Savostyanova, A. A. (2011). Whether, how, and when social
anxiety shapes positive experiences and events: A self-regulatory framework and
treatment implications. Clinical Psychology Review, 31(5), 786–799.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2011.03.012
Kazdin, A. E. (1999). The meanings and measurement of clinical significance. Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 67(3), 332–339. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022006X.67.3.332
Kendall, P. C., & Hollon, S. D. (1981). Assessing self-referent speech: Methods in the
measurement of self-statements. In P. C. Kendall & S. D. Hollon (Eds.),Assessment
strategies for cognitive-behavioral interventions. New York: Academic Press
Kessler, R. C., Chiu, W. T., Demler, O., & Walters, E. E. (2005). Prevalence, severity, and
comorbidity of 12-month DSM-IV disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey

60

Replication. Archives of General Psychiatry, 62(6), 617.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.62.6.617
Kim, D., Bae, H., & Chon Park, Y. (2008). Validity of the Subjective Units of Disturbance Scale
in EMDR. Journal of EMDR Practice and Research, 2(1), 57–62.
http://doi.org/10.1891/1933-3196.2.1.57
Kranzler, H. R., Kadden, R. M., Babor, T. F., Tennen, H., & Rounsaville, B. J. (1996). Validity
of the SCID in substance abuse patients. Addiction, 91(6), 859–868.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1360-0443.1996.tb03580.x
Lange, W.G., Salemink, E., Windey, I., Keijsers, G. P., Krans, J., Becker, E. S., & Rinck, M.
(2010). Does modified interpretation bias influence automatic avoidance behaviour?
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 24(3), 326–337. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/acp.1679
Ledley, D. R., Erwin, B. A., Heimberg, R. G., Craighead, W. E., Miklowitz, D. J., Craighead, L.
W., … Craighead, L. W. (2008). Social anxiety disorder. Psychopathology: History,
Diagnosis, and Empirical Foundations, 198–233.
Lewinsohn, P. M., Seeley, J. R., Roberts, R. E., & Allen, N. B. (1997). Center for Epidemiologic
Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) as a screening instrument for depression among
community-residing older adults. Psychology and Aging, 12(2), 277.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0882-7974.12.2.277
Liebowitz, M. R. (1987). Social phobia. Modern Problems of Pharmacopsychiatry.
http://doi.apa.org/psycinfo/1988-23625-001
Lira Yoon, K., & Zinbarg, R. E. (2007). Threat is in the eye of the beholder: Social anxiety and
the interpretation of ambiguous facial expressions. Behaviour Research and Therapy,
45(4), 839–847. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2006.05.004

61

Lobbestael, J., Leurgans, M., & Arntz, A. (2011). Inter-rater reliability of the structured clinical
interview for DSM-IV axis I disorders (SCID I) and axis II disorders (SCID II). Clinical
Psychology & Psychotherapy, 18(1), 75–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/cpp.693
Longmore, R. J., & Worrell, M. (2007). Do we need to challenge thoughts in cognitive behavior
therapy? Clinical Psychology Review, 27(2), 173–187.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2006.08.001
MacLeod, C., Mathews, A., & Tata, P. (1986). Attentional bias in emotional disorders. Journal
of Abnormal Psychology, 95(1), 15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.95.1.15
Magee, W. J., Eaton, W. W., Wittchen, H. U., McGonagle, K. A., & Kessler, R. C. (1996).
Agoraphobia, simple phobia, and social phobia in the National Comorbidity Survey.
Archives of General Psychiatry, 53(2), 159.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.1996.01830020077009
Mansell, W., Clark, D. M., Ehlers, A., & Chen, Y.P. (1999). Social anxiety and attention away
from emotional faces. Cognition & Emotion, 13(6), 673–690.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/026999399379032
Mathews, A., & Mackintosh, B. (2000). Induced emotional interpretation bias and anxiety.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 109(4), 602–615. http://doi.org/10.1037/0021843X.109.4.602
Mathews, A., & MacLeod, C. (1994). Cognitive approaches to emotion and emotional disorders.
Annual Review of Psychology, 45(1), 25–50.
Mathews, A., & MacLeod, C. (2005). Cognitive vulnerability to emotional disorders. Annu. Rev.
Clin. Psychol., 1, 167–195. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.clinpsy.1.102803.143916
Mathews, A., Ridgeway, V., Cook, E., & Yiend, J. (2007). Inducing a benign interpretational

62

bias reduces trait anxiety. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry,
38(2), 225–236. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbtep.2006.10.011
McFarland, D. (1981). The Oxford companion to animal behavior. Oxford; New York: Oxford
University Press.
Mennin, D. S., Fresco, D. M., Heimberg, R. G., Schneier, F. R., Davies, S. O., & Liebowitz, M.
R. (2002). Screening for social anxiety disorder in the clinical setting: using the
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 16(6), 661–673.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0887-6185(02)00134-2
Mogg, K., & Bradley, B. P. (1998). A cognitive- motivational analysis of anxiety. Behaviour
Research and Therapy, 36(9), 809–848. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7967(98)00063-1
Mogg, K., & Bradley, B. P. (2002). Selective orienting of attention to masked threat faces in
social anxiety. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40(12), 1403–1414.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7967(02)00017-7
Mogg, K., Philippot, P., & Bradley, B. P. (2004). Selective attention to angry faces in clinical
social phobia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 113(1), 160.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.113.1.160
Murphy, R., Hirsch, C. R., Mathews, A., Smith, K., & Clark, D. M. (2007). Facilitating a benign
interpretation bias in a high socially anxious population. Behaviour Research and
Therapy, 45(7), 1517–1529. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2007.01.007
Neubauer, K., von Auer, M., Murray, E., Petermann, F., Helbig-Lang, S., & Gerlach, A. L.
(2013). Internet-delivered attention modification training as a treatment for social phobia:
A randomized controlled trial. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 51(2), 87–97.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2012.10.006

63

Newman, M. G., Hofmann, S. G., Trabert, W., Roth, W. T., & Taylor, C. B. (1994). Does
behavioral treatment of social phobia lead to cognitive changes? Behavior Therapy,
25(3), 503–517. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7894(05)80160-1
Nortje, C., Posthumus, T., & Moller, A. T. (2008). Comparison of integrated cognitive
restructuring plus exposure with exposure alone in group treatment of generalised social
anxiety disorder. South African Journal of Psychology, 38, 647–658.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/008124630803800405
Olfson, M., Guardino, M., Struening, E., Schneier, F. R., Hellman, F., & Klein, D. F. (2000).
Barriers to the treatment of social anxiety. American Journal of Psychiatry, 157(4), 521.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.157.4.521
Pineles, S. L., & Mineka, S. (2005). Attentional biases to internal and external sources of
potential threat in social anxiety. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 114(2), 314.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.114.2.314
Pishyar, R., Harris, L. M., & Menzies, R. G. (2004). Attentional bias for words and faces in
social anxiety. Anxiety, Stress & Coping, 17(1), 23–36.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10615800310001601458
Planalp, S., De Francisco, V.L., & Rutherford, D. (1996). Varieties of cues to
emotion in naturally occurring situations. Cognition & Emotion, 10(2), 137–154.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/026999396380303
Price, M., Mehta, N., Tone, E., & Anderson, P. (2011). Does engagement with exposure yield
better outcomes? Components of presence as a predictor of treatment response for virtual
reality exposure therapy for social phobia. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 25(6), 763–770.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.janxdis.2011.03.004

64

Price, R., Kuckertz, J., Siegle, G., Ladouceur, C., Silk, J., Ryan, N., Dahl, R., & Amir, N. (2014).
Empirical recommendations for improving the stability of the dot-probe task in clinical
research. Psychological Assessment. DOI: 10.1037/pas0000036
Radloff, L. S. (1977). The CES-D scale a self-report depression scale for research in the general
population. Applied Psychological Measurement, 1(3), 385–401.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014662167700100306
Rapee, R. M., & Heimberg, R. G. (1997). A cognitive-behavioral model of anxiety in social
phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35(8), 741–756. http://doi.org/10.1016/S00057967(97)00022-3
Risko, E. F., Laidlaw, K. E., Freeth, M., Foulsham, T., & Kingstone, A. (2012). Social attention
with real versus reel stimuli: toward an empirical approach to concerns about ecological
validity. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6.
Rozenman, M., Amir, N., & Weersing, V. R. (2014). Performance-based interpretation bias in
clinically anxious youths: Relationships with attention, anxiety, and negative
cognition. Behavior Therapy. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2014.03.009
Schmidt, N. B., Richey, J. A., Buckner, J. D., & Timpano, K. R. (2009). Attention training for
generalized social anxiety disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 118(1), 5.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0013643
Schneier, F. R., Johnson, J., Hornig, C. D., Liebowitz, M. R., & Weissman, M. M. (1992). Social
phobia: comorbidity and morbidity in an epidemiologic sample. Archives of General
Psychiatry, 49(4), 282. http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.1992.01820040034004
Schultz, L. T., & Heimberg, R. G. (2008). Attentional focus in social anxiety disorder: Potential

65

for interactive processes. Clinical Psychology Review, 28(7), 1206–1221.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2008.04.003
Shiffrin, R. M., & Schneider, W. (1977). Controlled and automatic human information
processing: II. Perceptual learning, automatic attending and a general theory.
Psychological Review, 84(2), 127. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.84.2.127
Spielberger, C. D., & Gorsuch, R. L. (1983). State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults: Sampler
Set: Manual, Tekst Booklet and Scoring Key. Consulting Psychologists Press.
Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L., & Lushene, R. E. (1970). Manual for the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory. Retrieved from http://ubir.buffalo.edu/xmlui/handle/10477/2895
Sposari, J. A., & Rapee, R. M. (2007). Attentional bias toward facial stimuli under conditions of
social threat in socially phobic and nonclinical participants. Cognitive Therapy and
Research, 31(1), 23–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10608-006-9073-2
Stopa, L., & Clark, D. M. (2000). Social phobia and interpretation of social events. Behaviour
Research and Therapy, 38(3), 273–283. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7967(99)000431
Turner, S. M., & Beidel, D. C. (1988). Some further comments on the measurement of social
phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 26(5), 411–413.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(88)90075-7
Voncken, M. J., & Bögels, S. M. (2008). Social performance deficits in social anxiety disorder:
Reality during conversation and biased perception during speech. Journal of Anxiety
Disorders, 22(8), 1384–1392. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.janxdis.2008.02.001
Williams, J. M. G., Watts, F. N., MacLeod, C., & Mathews, A. (1988). Cognitive psychology and
emotional disorders. John Wiley & Sons. Retrieved from

66

http://doi.apa.org/psycinfo/1991-98258-000
Winton, E. C., Clark, D. M., & Edelmann, R. J. (1995). Social anxiety, fear of negative
evaluation and the detection of negative emotion in others. Behaviour Research and
Therapy, 33(2), 193–196. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(94)E0019-F
Wolpe, J. (1973). The practice of behavior therapy. Pergamon. Retrieved from
http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1974-07740-000

67

APPENDIX A
LSAS-SR
Please read each situation carefully and provide an answer to each column for that situation. The first
column refers to how anxious or fearful you feel in the situation. The second refers to how often you
avoid the situation. If you come across a situation that you ordinarily do not experience, we ask that you
imagine "what if you were faced with that situation," and then, rate the degree to which you would fear
this hypothetical situation and how often you would tend to avoid it. Please base your ratings on the way
that the situations have affected you in the last week.
Fear or
Anxiety
0 = None
1 = Mild
2 = Moderate
3 = Severe
1.

Telephoning in public (P)

2.

Participating in small groups (P)

3.

Eating in public places (P)

4.

Drinking with others in public places (P)

5.

Talking to people in authority (S)

6.

Acting, performing or giving a talk in front
of an audience (P)

7.

Going to a party (S)

8.

Working while being observed (P)

9.

Writing while being observed (P)

10.

Calling someone you don’t know very well
(S)

11.

Talking with people you don’t know very
well (S)

12.

Meeting strangers (S)

13.

Urinating n a public bathroom (P)

14.

Entering a room when others are already

Avoidance
0 = Never (0%)
1 = Occasionally (1-33%)
2 = Often (33-67%)
3 = Usually (67-100%)
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seated (P)
15.

Being the center of attention (S)

16.

Speaking up at a meeting (P)

17.

Taking a test (P)

18.

Expressing a disagreement or disapproval to
people you don’t know very well (S)

19.

Looking at people you don’t know very well
in the eyes (S)

20.

Giving a report to a group (P)

21.

Trying to pick up someone (P)

22.

Returning goods to a store (S)

23.

Giving a party (S)

24.

Resisting a high pressure salesperson (S)
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Appendix B

Sample items of the STAI-State:
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Appendix C

